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In this paper we investigate whether peers' behavior influences the choice of college major, thus contributing
to the mismatch of skills in the labor market. Using a newly constructed dataset, we are able to identify
the endogenous effect of peers on such decisions through a novel identification strategy that solves
the common econometric problems of studies of social interactions. Results show that, indeed, one
is more likely to choose a major when many of her peers make the same choice. We also provide evidence
on skills mismatch in terms of entry wages and occupation. We find that peers can divert students
from majors in which they have a relative ability advantage, with adverse consequences on academic
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The importance of peers in shaping individual behavior has been widely recognized in both the
economic and the sociological literature. Numerous studies have produced empirical evidence docu-
menting the existence of relevant peer e⁄ects in many areas, from schooling performance to criminal
behavior and ￿nancial decisions (Katz and Case, 1991; Hoxby, 2000; Sacerdote, 2001; Du￿ o and
Saez, 2003; Ammermueller and Pischke, 2006).
Despite the vast literature on the topic, the identi￿cation of social interactions remains very
problematic because of two well-known issues: endogeneity - due either to peers￿self-selection or
to common group (correlated) e⁄ects - and re￿ ection - a particular case of simultaneity (Manski,
1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Mo¢ tt, 2001; Soetevent, 2006).
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, on the methodological side, we develop a new
general strategy for the estimation of peer e⁄ects and particularly of their endogenous component,
usually de￿ned as the impact of the average peers￿outcome on individual outcome. The many
hurdles involved in the identi￿cation of such parameter have somewhat concealed its importance
for policy interventions. The extent and power of endogenous interactions are, in fact, crucial to
determine the magnitude of the e⁄ect of any manipulation of exogenous or group characteristics.
Moreover, large-scale policy interventions that are likely to generate general equilibrium e⁄ects can-
not be properly evaluated without knowledge of the endogenous interaction parameter. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the literature already o⁄ers numerous examples of policy interventions
that consist of a direct manipulation of the endogenous e⁄ect. This is the case, for instance, of the
immunization program implemented in Kenya and analyzed in Miguel and Kremer (2004) or the
PROGRESA program in Mexico (Todd and Wolpin, 2006).
The second contribution of the paper concerns the particular outcome considered: students￿
choices of college major. The analysis of social interactions in education has so far been focused
almost exclusively on academic performance. The only exception, to our knowledge, is Sacerdote
(2001), who does not ￿nd any signi￿cant in￿ uence of peers on major choice.1
Social interactions, and particularly the endogenous in￿ uence of peers, are likely to be crucial
in determining students￿choices above and beyond their documented e⁄ect on performance. For
1Notice, however, that in Sacerdote￿ s paper, endogenous and exogenous e⁄ects could not be separated.example, when deciding whether to go to college, which particular school to attend or in which
￿eld to specialize, peers may provide precious and otherwise costly information. Moreover, to
many students, classmates also represent a natural reference group and conformist behaviors are
extremely common during adolescence (see Akerlof and Kranton, 2002). Finally, there might simply
be a utility gain from attending school or courses with one￿ s friends.
Peer e⁄ects in schooling choices can be particularly important in explaining why such decisions
are often somewhat ine¢ cient, as documented in several branches of the economic literature. For
example, recent evidence in the large literature on wage inequality (Goldin and Katz, 2007) suggests
that most of the dynamics in wage inequality in the 1980s and 1990s has been driven by the slow
response of (skilled) labor supply rather than by an acceleration in the demand for skills. Although
our focus is on major choice and not speci￿cally on college enrollment, these two decisions should
not be fundamentally di⁄erent, particularly regarding the role of peers.
Another dimension of ine¢ cient schooling decisions, more closely connected to the choice of
major, is skill mismatch. The fact that large fractions of workers are employed in jobs unrelated
to their studies has been documented already some time ago (Farber, 1999), even if the issue has
remained largely unexplored. Among the few recent contributions, Gottschalk and Hansen (2003)
analyze the trends in college graduates that are occupied in "non-college" jobs, while Robst (2007)
shows that being employed in a job outside one￿ s major ￿eld negatively and signi￿cantly a⁄ects the
returns to schooling. Bender and Heywood (2006) provide similar evidence for a sample of PhD
graduates in the US.
Correctly understanding the dynamics of schooling choices is, thus, crucial for any policy inter-
vention aimed at reducing these ine¢ ciencies and peer e⁄ects are likely to play a key role in this
framework.
In this paper we apply our identi￿cation strategy to the estimation of peer e⁄ects in the choice
of major and we show that peers￿in￿ uence can indeed lead students to make schooling decisions
that contrast with their revealed abilities. Further, by observing students in their ￿rst job after
graduation we are also able to estimate the e⁄ect of di⁄erent major decision modes on wages and
on the (self-reported) probability of job-mismatch. In particular, we ￿nd that those students who
choose a major following their peers and in contrast to their revealed ability graduate with lower
￿nal marks, end up in lower paid jobs and are more likely to be mismatched.Our ￿ndings do not directly support any speci￿c policy intervention, with the possible exception
of providing better information to students about the available schooling options. However, we
contribute substantially to the understanding of the mechanism that underlies a large set of schooling
choices, thus allowing a better design and evaluation of any policy aimed at improving the allocation
of skills to jobs.
Our study is based on a newly constructed set of administrative data on undergraduate students
from Bocconi University. In these data, groups of peers are nicely de￿ned by institutional features.
At the time covered by our data, Bocconi students initially enrolled in a common program and
only at the end of their third semester did they choose whether to specialize in one of two majors:
business or economics. During the ￿rst three semesters, all students took nine compulsory courses
and attended lectures in randomly assigned classes for each course. This process of repeated random
allocation naturally de￿nes groups of peers that vary at the level of each single student and are thus
immune from simultaneity (or re￿ ection). Moreover, since the allocation into the classes is random,
endogeneity in peer group formation is also excluded by construction.2
Having peer groups that vary at the individual level also guarantees the presence of excluded
classmates, i.e. students who did not attend classes with student i but did attend some courses
with some of i￿ s peers. The exogenous characteristics of such excluded peers are a natural set of
instruments to overcome potential endogeneity generated by common (correlated) group e⁄ects.3
Individual-speci￿c groups and the use of excluded peers as instruments de￿ne a new strategy for
the correct identi￿cation of social interactions that, far from being peculiar to our speci￿c setting,
can be applied to numerous other contexts. In the real world one rarely belongs to only one ￿xed
group of peers. On the contrary, we all have friends, mates and colleagues that may overlap, but
very rarely perfectly coincide. Whenever the units of analysis are linked directly to some other
units (the peers) but only indirectly (through peers) connected to others (the peers of peers), our
identi￿cation could be fruitfully adopted. In the network literature (Calv￿ et al., 2004; Jackson,
2006) this corresponds to the existence of links of (at least) diameter 2.
The spectrum of applications of our identi￿cation strategy is, therefore, potentially larger than
2Note that the exogenous formation of groups only simpli￿es our analysis, but it is not a necessary feature of the
novel identi￿cation strategy that we propose. In principle, our approach can be applied to settings in which groups
form endogenously, in which case one would have to take that process into account.
3The usual suspects for group shocks in the education framework are teachers￿e⁄ects or classmates￿disruptive
behaviors.that of current empirical approaches for the estimation of peer e⁄ects. Perhaps, a limitation might
come from the stricter data requirements. Our strategy, in fact, requires knowledge of all (or many)
indirect links among peers of peers. However, data of this type are becoming more and more
popular and easily available. In fact, it is likely that in many existing datasets our approach could
be readily replicated. Some recent papers could already exploit our identi￿cation with no additional
data requirement, like Bayer et al. (2004), a study of criminal behavior where peers￿characteristics
are weighted by the time spent in the same correctional facility; Calv￿ et al. (2006), who focus on
the in￿ uence of the position of a player in a particular network on academic performance; Guiso
and Schivardi (2007) who look at spillovers in employment and investments of ￿rms located in the
same district and Mas and Moretti (2008) in their analysis of social interactions among supermarket
cashiers.
Our econometric methodology di⁄ers from the existing literature that tries to recover peer
e⁄ects using either laboratory experiments (Falk and Ichino, 2006), natural experiments (Sacerdote,
2001; Zimmerman, 2003), quasi-experimental designs (Hoxby, 2000), ￿xed e⁄ects (Hanushek et al.,
2003) or higher order moments (Graham, 2006). Laschever (2005) is, to our knowledge, the ￿rst
application of a multiple group framework. In a paper developed independently and at the same
time as ours, BramoullØ et al. (2006) discuss identi￿cation of peer e⁄ects in a network framework
that is very close to ours.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional structure of Bocconi
University, the available data and the details of the allocation of students into classes; Section 3
presents our approach for the construction of the peer groups; Section 4 discusses the identi￿cation
strategy and the results of the analysis of the choice of major. In Section 5 we provide a number of
robustness checks. Section 6 discusses the e⁄ects of the decision modes on ￿nal academic and labor
market outcomes. Finally, Section 7 concludes.2 Data and institutional details4
The analysis in this paper is based on administrative data from Bocconi University, and on a series
of surveys conducted by the university on its recent graduates to collect information concerning
their labor market outcomes. Our analysis uses information on one entire cohort of students who
entered University in the academic year 1998/99 and enrolled in the CLEA/CLEP program, the
most popular degree o⁄ered by Bocconi at that time.
Students in this program would ￿rst follow a common track of nine exams during the initial three
semesters and would then choose whether to specialize in business (CLEA) or economics (CLEP)
(See Figure 1). The nine common compulsory courses are listed in Table 1 and can be classi￿ed
by subject areas according to the department responsible for the teaching: business, economics,
quantitative subjects and law.
[FIGURE 1 and TABLE 1]
Excluding a few missing values for our variables of interest and those students who did not
complete the courses of the ￿rst 3 semesters, our working sample consists of the 1,141 observations
described in Table 2.5 A few of them (less than 10%) have not graduated, either because they
dropped out, moved to another university or are still enrolled and trying to graduate. The distrib-
ution across majors is strongly skewed towards business with only about 13% of students choosing
CLEP.
[TABLE 2]
Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics on the ability and performance of these two groups of
students. Considering all the common exams in the ￿rst three semesters, the 145 students choosing
CLEP score on average almost 2 grade-points above the CLEA students (exams are graded on a
4In this section we describe only the most important features of the data and the institutional background. Further
details can be found in Appendix A.
5We also exclude students transferring from other universities and students from abroad who were given reserved
places.scale of 0 to 30, with a passing grade equal to 18). This di⁄erence is even higher when the exams
are disaggregated by ￿eld. As expected, CLEP students perform relatively better in economics and
quantitative subjects, while the di⁄erence is considerably smaller for the average grade in business
courses.
[TABLE 3]
Further, we exploit a number of surveys conducted by the university on its alumni, who are
contacted and interviewed about 1.5 years after graduation. Unfortunately, the response rates are
not particularly high, especially for the earlier years and for males, who often did their compulsory
military service right after graduation.6 For these reasons, we can recover labor market information
only for 448 of the 1,027 students in our working sample who eventually graduated from Bocconi.
This selection is obviously non-random; however most of it is driven by observable characteristics,
namely the survey wave, the respondent￿ s gender and the place of residence.7 Notice, additionally,
that in all our analyzes we always condition on a very large set of observable characteristics, many
of which are often unobservable in other datasets (e.g. ability as measured by the entry test score).
The available labor market data include questions on monthly wages in the ￿rst job, the type of
occupation and contract, and a number of questions on satisfaction with the job and the university.
The last rows of Table 2 report some descriptive statistics for the variables that will be explored
later in section 6.1. Wages are observed for all graduates who have had a job between the day
of their graduation and the day of the interview (a large majority of 97%) and are recorded in 7
intervals of 250 or 500 euros. The lowest interval is for wages below 750 per month and the highest
above 5,000. The reported mean and standard deviation refer to an imputed measure of wages
computed at the mid-point of the interval indicated by the respondent. All monetary values are in
euros evaluated at 2005 prices.
6The military service was 10 months long and university students could postpone it until graduation. Over the
years, the reasons for complete exemption have been expanded (for example, around 2000 a set of new rules allowed
permanent exemption from the service to students who enrolled in a PhD programme). The compulsory military
service was abolished in 2001 for all citizens born after 1985.
7These variables alone explain about 30% of the probability of survey participation. Moreover, the indicator
for survey participation is never signi￿cant in any regression with measures of performance or ability as dependent
variables. This result is una⁄ected by the introduction of additional covariates.Our labor market data also allow us to construct a more direct measure of job mismatch using
a question regarding work conditions and di¢ culties encountered by the student in her ￿rst job.
The speci￿c question reads as follows: "In your ￿rst job, have you experienced any of the following
problems/di¢ culties?" The list of possible answers is: tasks were too easy, tasks were too demand-
ing, problems with team work, relationship problems with colleagues, di¢ culties with ￿nding one￿ s
position in the organization, job is not secure, low pay, job does not ￿t personal attitudes. More
than one item can be indicated. The measure we adopt is a simple dummy variable that equals 1
if the respondent indicates at least one problem and zero otherwise. However, as we will discuss
at length in Section 6.1, our main results are extremely robust to the particular de￿nition of the
mismatch variable.
2.1 Lecturing classes
Within each of the nine compulsory courses students are randomly assigned to teaching classes.8
The number of classes for each course depends on the number of available lecturers. Moreover, the
capacity of the available classrooms at Bocconi varies considerably and the number of students in
each class had to be determined accordingly. The decision to adopt a random allocation algorithm
was dictated by the need to avoid congestion in the classrooms resulting from students wanting to
attend lectures with their friends or with the ￿best￿teachers.
Towards the end of each term, students had to enroll in the courses of the following term either
at the administration desk or through computers located in the university buildings. Moreover,
students who failed to pass an exam during the academic year in which they had attended the
corresponding course, were required to re-register and were also assigned randomly to a new class
(together with other students). For these reasons, the total number of students enrolled in each
course (the sum over all the classes) may vary slightly across subjects.
When enrolling for a course, the algorithm would randomly assign the student to a class and
communicate the allocated class number. By no means could the students interfere with the al-
8The terms class and lecture often have di⁄erent meanings in di⁄erent countries and sometimes also in di⁄erent
schools within the same country. In most British universities, for example, lecture indicates a teaching session where
an instructor - typically a full faculty member - presents the main material of the course. Classes are instead practical
sessions where a teacher assistant solves problem sets and applied exercises with the students. At Bocconi there was
no such distinction, meaning that the same randomly allocated groups were kept for both regular lectures and applied
classes. Hence, in the remainder of the paper we use the two terms interchangeably.gorithm. For example, there was no guarantee that two students enrolling in the same course one
right after the other would be placed in the same teaching class.
In principle, students were required to attend lectures in their assigned classes, but enforcement
varied substantially over time, becoming stricter in more recent years. Actually, the evolution of
enforcement practices is closely related to the availability of the information on lecturing classes: as
the enforcement of the allocations was made more and more stringent, lecturing classes were also
recorded on various o¢ cial documents and thus maintained in the administration￿ s archives.
The mere fact that lecturing classes have been carefully recorded for the 1998/1999 cohort is an
indication that the system was e⁄ectively enforced.9 Additionally, students were forced to attend
their assigned classes by various methods. First, lecturers were supposed to circulate attendance
sheets at the beginning of each class for students to sign their presence. Obviously, with a large
number of students in each class (the average class size was 202 students), it was relatively easy
for those who wanted to attend a di⁄erent class to have someone else signing for them. Mid-terms
were also important in encouraging students to attend their assigned classes. In fact, while the ￿nal
exams were identical for all students regardless of their classes, mid-terms were organized directly
by the lecturers. Therefore, if a student wanted to take the mid-term (which were not compulsory,
but highly recommended and very popular among the students), it would be in her interest to
attend her assigned class, as the exam was prepared and marked by the same lecturer.
[TABLE 4]
Table 4 describes the average characteristics of the lecturing classes for each course. The number
of classes ranges from 4 (private and public law) to 10 (mathematics, management and accounting)
and the average number of enrolled students varies accordingly. The other variables in Table 4 are
derived from students￿questionnaires.10
The number of completed questionnaires is a one-o⁄ measure of attendance, as it should cor-
respond to the number of students present in class on the day the questionnaire was distributed.
9There are less than 2% of missing values.
10As it is now customary in most universities, at the end of each course students are asked to evaluate both the
teaching and the logistics of the lectures by ￿lling a questionnaire. The congestion variable reported in Table 4 is
computed from such questionnaires which are available in our dataset at the level of each single class.This one o⁄ measure is most likely a lower bound of true attendance given that completing the
questionnaire was not compulsory and no strong incentives were provided to increase reporting.
Further, typically the form was distributed at the end of a two hours class and would require some
e⁄ort from the students.
Attendance is also self-reported by the students in the questionnaire, where they indicate the
fraction of lectures they attended for that course. These ￿gures indicate that attendance was typi-
cally very high, with students being present at over 80% of the lectures for economics, management
and quantitative courses.
Only law subjects have very low attendance levels. At that time Bocconi did not have a law
department and relied exclusively on external professors (from other universities). For this reason,
the number of law classes that could be created was relatively small (4) and their size was conse-
quently extremely high; the administration was well aware of the low attendance in these courses.
For these reasons we never use information on the law subjects for the de￿nition of the peer groups.
The congestion variable provides an indication of how e⁄ectively the allocation into teaching
classes was enforced in each course and we will use it later on in Section 5 for some robustness
checks.
3 Peer group de￿nition
Our de￿nition of peers is based on students attending courses in the same classes and it is meant to
capture the network in which students interact academically and socially. The underlying assump-
tion is that these interactions are fostered by class attendance so that the relevant set of peers for
each student overlaps (at least partly) with classmates.
Class attendance heavily in￿ uences how, where and with whom students spend most of their
time. Each of the 9 compulsory courses is taught in 3 weekly sessions of 2 hours. Hence, students
taking only one course together would be sitting in the same classroom for 6 hours per week for a
term period of 12 or 13 weeks. Students taking all 9 courses together would spend as much as 700
hours in the same room over the 3 semesters.
While considering classes is standard in the literature on peer e⁄ects in high school, in our case
e⁄ective attendance and the large size of the lecturing classes may cast doubts on the possibility ofcapturing relevant peer interactions by looking at assigned classmates (see Table 4). We address this
problem by excluding the two law courses from our de￿nition of peer groups and, more importantly,
also by weighting peers by the number of common courses attended together.
In our preferred speci￿cation, the weights are non linear as only students who attended at least
4 of the 7 common courses in the same classes are considered peers.11 This restricted de￿nition is
particularly interesting because it leads to group sizes that are comparable to other papers in the
literature, particularly those that look at high school classes. For completeness, however, we also
present all our results using a simpler, but also looser, de￿nition where any two students who have
taken at least one course together are considered peers.
More formally, individual i￿ s peer group (Gi) includes all individuals j who were assigned to the
same class as individual i for at least 4 of the 7 courses that we consider (all 9 common exams minus
the 2 law subjects). Furthermore, each of the j 2 Gi is given an importance weight, !ij 2 (0;1],
according to the number of common courses taken together with i, i.e. !ij = 1 if j attends all 7
courses in the same class as i, !ij = 4=7 if j attends 4 courses with i, and so on.12 When computing
means of variables at the group level the weights are normalized to sum to one within each group.
[TABLE 5]
The ￿rst two columns of Table 5 report some characteristics of these groups. In column 1 we
consider as peers only students who have attended at least 4 courses in the same classes, while
in column 2 the groups are constructed according to the looser de￿nition. The mean raw group
size is approximately 18 students in the stricter de￿nition and goes up to 674 when all peers are
considered. On average, students in these groups are assigned to the same classes for 4.2 and 1.6
courses respectively, which implies that, when peers are weighted by the number of courses taken
together, the size of the groups goes down to 10.7 in our main de￿nition and to 151 with the looser
de￿nition.
11We choose the threshold of 4 courses because it is the highest that guarantees a non-empty peer group for all
students (i.e. there are some students who have never taken more than 4 courses with others).
12The weights adopted in the core of the paper are linear in the number of courses attended together both for the
restricted and the looser de￿nition of peer group. We have experimented with many other speci￿cations and the
results are robust to the weighting scheme; see Section 5.[TABLE 6]
As a ￿rst check of the validity of our de￿nition of peers, Table 6 shows that, after the initial 3
semesters, students who have attended lectures in the same random classes also show remarkably
similar academic patterns. In the upper panel of Table 6, for example, we show that students who
were randomly assigned to the same classes are signi￿cantly more likely to graduate in the same
session.13 For the average student in our sample, approximately 12.5% of the non-peers graduate
in the same session. This number goes up to 13.4% for peers in our most comprehensive de￿nition
(column 1) and it increases steadily as the de￿nition becomes more stringent (columns 2 to 4). In
our stricter de￿nition the probability of graduating in the same session is almost twice (22.4%) that
for non-peers in our sample. The di⁄erences are always strongly statistically signi￿cant.
In the middle panel of Table 6 we contrast the number of peers and non-peers who choose the
same sub-major (i.e. ￿eld). Within each of the main majors - economics and business - students
could further specialize in di⁄erent ￿elds, like marketing or accounting within business and ￿nance
or theory within economics. The students in our sample could choose among 8 sub-majors within
the economics area and 16 sub-majors within the business area. Among students who have attended
at least one of the 7 common courses in the same random class on average slightly more than 9.6%
of peers choose the same sub-major. This compares to a marginally lower incidence of students
making similar choices among the non-peers. As we restrict our de￿nition of peers to students
who have attended more and more courses in the same classes, the di⁄erence between peers and
non-peers increases and becomes statistically signi￿cant. Only with the strictest de￿nition (column
4) does this di⁄erence become smaller and insigni￿cant again.
Finally, in the lower panel of Table 6 we look at the probability of choosing the same thesis
supervisor (advisor). Once again, students who have been assigned to the same classes in the initial
three semesters are substantially more likely to choose the same advisor roughly two years later,
and such probability increases with the number of courses taken together.14
13In the period covered by our data, students could graduate in several di⁄erent sessions throughout the year
(almost one session per month). During these sessions, which lasted one or two days, students present their ￿nal
dissertation to a committee which decides their ￿nal mark (based on both the dissertation and their GPA). Students
could freely choose when to graduate, a decision that is usually a⁄ected both by how quickly they complete their
coursework and by how much time they spend on their dissertation. See Garibaldi et al. (2007).
14Note that the pattern in the probability of choosing the same advisor might also be in￿ uenced by the fact thatThe evidence in Table 6 shows that randomly assigned peers eventually follow similar academic
patterns, suggesting that they actually interact with each other. Moreover, the stronger e⁄ects that
emerge for peers that have attended more and more courses supports the idea of our weighting
scheme, which should indeed emphasize the most intense interactions.
Despite all our e⁄orts, our peer groups could still be measured with error, an issue that we
discuss more at length in Section 5. Nevertheless, a more general point can already be made here.
Without some knowledge of the mechanism that generates social interactions, it is extremely hard
to establish a priori who is going to in￿ uence whom, hence measurement error in the de￿nition of
the groups a⁄ects virtually all studies of peer e⁄ects. In fact, the level and degree of interactions
are entirely speci￿c not only to the context but also to the speci￿c social mechanism. For example,
if peer e⁄ects arise due to imitation, it is unclear that the de￿nition of the groups should be limited
to close friends, since one may in fact follow the behavior of the average person, thus including close
friends as well as simple acquaintances.
In the literature the de￿nition of peer groups varies substantially, from possibly the most com-
prehensive, i.e. same race in the State of residence in the US (Charles et al., 2007), to the very
restrictive roommate in a college dorm (Sacerdote, 2001). Our de￿nition is to the restrictive end
of the spectrum, and it appears as the most natural given the institutional setting. In section 5,
we perform additional robustness checks by experimenting with alternative de￿nitions and we also
discuss the results of a simulation exercise, that is presented in fuller details in Appendix B.
4 Peer e⁄ects in major choices
4.1 Identi￿cation strategy
The identi￿cation of social interaction e⁄ects has been the topic of several papers (Manski, 1993,
Brock and Durlauf, 2001 and Mo¢ tt, 2001 to cite just a few) and it rests on two distinct dimensions:
endogeneity and re￿ ection. Endogeneity may arise for at least two reasons: ￿rst, people usually
choose their peers endogenously and, second, common unobserved shocks may hit the group as a
students who have attended the same classes have also met the same professors. However, students typically pick
their advisors among the teachers of later elective courses, hence the evidence in Table 6 can hardly be explained
solely by the fact that students have met the same professors in the initial compulsory courses.whole (teacher e⁄ects are the usual suspect in studies of education). As a consequence, when we
observe a signi￿cant correlation between individual and group outcomes it is hard to say whether
this result is due to true peer e⁄ects or simply to endogenous group formation and/or correlated
e⁄ects.
The second problem - re￿ ection - arises because in a peer group everyone￿ s behavior a⁄ects the
others and, as in a mirror re￿ ection, we cannot know if one￿ s action is the cause or the e⁄ect of
peers￿actions. Although particularly cumbersome, this is essentially a problem of simultaneity.
Let us start with a discussion of how we address re￿ ection. This problem has been commonly
described by using a simple linear in means model:
yi = ￿ + ￿E(yjGi) + ￿E(xjGi) + ￿xi + ui (1)
In our framework, yi is the chosen major (i.e. economics or business), xi is a set of individual
traits, and E(xjGi) contains the averages of the x￿ s in the peer group of individual i, denoted by
Gi. Following the literature, ￿ measures the endogenous e⁄ect, and ￿ the exogenous e⁄ects. For
now assume E(uijGi;xi) = 0, i.e. no correlated e⁄ects or self-selection into groups.
In the standard framework, peer groups are ￿xed across individuals, i.e. if A and B are both in
the peer group of C, it must also be that A and B are in the same group. Put in the wording of
equation (1), if i and j are in the same peer group, then the two groups coincide, i.e. Gi = Gj. In
this situation, endogenous e⁄ects cannot be distinguished from exogenous e⁄ects (Manski, 1993).
In fact, it is easy to show, by simply averaging equation (1) over group Gi, that E(yjGi) is a linear












In our framework peer groups are instead individual-speci￿c. Consider the simple case of only
three students. Students A and B study together (e.g., they attend 4 courses in the same classes),
however, B also studies with C (e.g., they attend some of the remaining 3 courses in the same class,
di⁄erent from A￿ s class). A￿ s peer group includes only B, while B￿ s peer group includes both A and
C. This identi￿cation can also be seen as a case of triangularization. In the standard simultaneous
equation model, at least one exogenous variable is excluded from each equation; here, A is excludedfrom the peer group of C, who is excluded from the peer group of A.
With 7 courses, each divided into 6 to 10 lecturing classes, our data exhibit enough variation
to generate peer groups that vary at the level of the single individual, so that every student has
a distinct group of peers. The weighting scheme described in the previous section adds even more
variation to such groups.
To formally see the advantage of this framework in solving the re￿ ection problem, rewrite equa-
tion (2) allowing peer groups to vary at the level of the single individual:
E(yijGi) = ￿ + ￿E[E(yjGj)jGi] + ￿E[E(xjGj)jGi] + ￿E(xijGi) (3)
where j is a generic member of i￿ s peer group. The key to understanding this equation is the fact
that j￿ s peer group Gj never coincides with Gi.
This result can be further clari￿ed by going back to the previous example with 3 students: A,
B and C, where A and B are in the same class for one subject and B and C sit together in another
course. This structure implies that GA : fBg, GB : fA;Cg and GC : fBg. Equation (1), then,
translates into the following three equations:
yA = ￿ + ￿yB + ￿xB + ￿xA + u
A
A
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yC = ￿ + ￿yB + ￿xB + ￿xC + u
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where the new reduced form error terms- ￿A
A, ￿B
B and ￿C




The example above shows how we achieve identi￿cation: we are left with four reduced form
parameters and four structural ones. Notice, additionally, that in this particular case the last
equation yC is redundant and, in fact, only observations with distinct groups of peers contribute to
identi￿cation.16
Although this particular setting allows us to solve re￿ ection, one might still worry about the
presence of correlated e⁄ects, i.e. common unobservable shocks at the group level which could undo




i = ￿i + ￿
g + "i (4)
with g = A;B;C and where ￿i is an individual ￿xed e⁄ect, ￿
g a group ￿xed e⁄ect (e.g. teacher
quality, class disruptions), and "i an i.i.d. random component.17 If we were to substitute (4) into
(1) we would face two problems of endogeneity arising from the individual e⁄ect (￿i) and the group
e⁄ect (￿
g).
In our particular case, the random nature of the peer groups rules out correlation between
the individual e⁄ect and any endogenous or exogenous e⁄ect (E(yjGi) and E(xjGi)).18 However,
unobservable group shocks could still be present and induce endogeneity, i.e. Cov (E (yjGi);￿
g) 6=
0.19 Even if our strategy e⁄ectively solves re￿ ection, the presence of correlated e⁄ects may still
generate endogeneity of E(yjGi) and impede identi￿cation.
One possible solution is to use instrumental variables. Fortunately, this setting naturally o⁄ers
valid instruments, namely peers of peers who are not in one￿ s own peer group. In fact, by con-
struction, the x￿ s of students who are excluded from i￿ s peer group but included in the group of
15The meaning of the double indexing - subscript and superscript - will become clear in a few paragraphs.
16In fact, A and C here have the same peer group, fBg, although they are not peers to each other. In our data,
however, there are no such cases and each single student has a distinct group of peers.
17The double indexing of the previous error terms should clarify the fact that these errors include both an individual
speci￿c error (￿i) and a group shock (￿
g).
18Additionally, our data include several observable proxies for variables that are generally unobservable to the
econometrician (i.e. standardized ability test, high school grades, type of high school, preferences, etc.) and we make
use of all of them to purge our results from potential residual endogeneity.
19Note that correlated e⁄ects cannot induce endogeneity of the exogenous e⁄ect - Cov (E (xjGi);￿
g) = 0 - since
the x￿ s are determined prior to the allocation to the groups.one or more of i￿ s peers are uncorrelated with the group ￿xed e⁄ect of i and correlated with the
mean outcome of i￿ s group through endogenous interactions. In our previous example, xC would be
a valid instrument for yB in group A. The logical chain is the following: xC, which is uncorrelated
with ￿
A, a⁄ects yC and, since C is a peer of B, through endogenous e⁄ects yC also a⁄ects yB. For
the same reasoning xA would be a valid instrument for yB in group C.
BramoullØ et al. (2006), written parallely (and independently) to our paper, present a more
general approach for the identi￿cation of social interactions that includes our speci￿c case.
In our data, the group of peers of peers - which we label excluded peers for clarity - for a generic
student i includes all other students who have never taken any of the 9 common courses in the
same lecturing classes of i, but have taken some of the 7 courses that we consider with one or more
of i￿ s peers. Importantly, we maintain the same de￿nition of excluded peers also when working
with groups de￿ned over students who take at least 4 courses together. This guarantees that the
excluded peers of any student i never attended any course in the same class of i, regardless of how
we de￿ne actual peers.
The average raw size of these groups is 252 students, as reported in the third column of Table
5. Notice additionally that the union of the groups of excluded and actual peers never spans the
entire sample. The student with the largest groups is linked either directly or indirectly to 1085
students, thus allowing for more than 50 totally excluded peers. On average, the sum of the two
groups is 927.
[FIGURE 2]
To better document the absence of self-selection in our setup, Figure 2 compares the distributions
of some selected individual characteristics in the entire population and in one randomly selected
group of peers and excluded peers. In the upper panels of the ￿gure we show the Kernel plots of
the distributions of two important measures of ability and academic outcomes, namely the entry
test score and the high school grade.
Not surprisingly the distributions of these variables are extremely similar in the population
and in the randomly taken groups of peers or excluded peers. We also performed two-sample
Kolmogorov￿ Smirnov tests for the equality of such distributions and in none of the cases we could
reject the null of equal distributions.Two features of the distributions of test scores and high school results are worth noticing. First,
the sharp increase of the density of test scores around the (normalized) values of 55 is due to the
practice adopted by Bocconi of rejecting students with particularly low test scores, regardless of
the availability of admission places. Second, the evident right skewedness of the distribution of
high school grades con￿rms the well known fact that Bocconi attracts a pool of positively selected
students.
In the lower panels of Figure 2 we look at two other characteristics: gender and determinedness
to major in economics (see Appendix A for a description of how this variable is constructed). Again
the proportions of both female and economics determined students are very similar. Two-sample
tests of proportions also fails to reject the null of equality.
4.2 Results
As already mentioned, the CLEA/CLEP program o⁄ered only two majors: economics and business.
Students had to make their choice after the initial three common semesters and the remaining ￿ve
terms were clearly di⁄erentiated across the two majors.20
To estimate the e⁄ect of peers on one￿ s decision to specialize in economics versus business, we
run a linear probability model similar to equation (1), where yi = 1 if a student chooses economics
and 0 otherwise. E(yjGi) is the (weighted) share of peers choosing economics and xi is a set of
controls for individual characteristics that includes a gender dummy, household income (as recorded
at the ￿rst registration), a dummy for students who reside outside the city of Milan (the site of
Bocconi), a set of dummies for the region of origin, a series of controls for academic performance
and ability (high school type and grades, results of the admission test) and an indicator of ex-ante
preferences over the two majors (i.e. whether a student was determined to major in economics at
enrollment, as described in Appendix A).21
[TABLE 7]
20Although some elective courses could be picked from any of the two majors, such practice was quite uncommon
and the number of such options very limited.
21We obtain very similar results with a probit model. However, we prefer the linear speci￿cation simply because
it shows more clearly the features of our identi￿cation strategy. Furthermore, the results are robust to the controls
added in the table.Table 7 reports the results of the estimation of linear probability models for our two de￿nitions
of peer groups: our preferred one, based on the restricted set of peers who have attended at least 4
courses in the same classes (columns 1 to 4), and one based on students who attended at least one
of the 7 common courses in the same class (columns 5 and 6).
For each of these de￿nitions, we estimate the model under two di⁄erent speci￿cations: simple
OLS and weighted IV, using the exogenous characteristics of the excluded peers as instruments and
weighting each excluded peer by the number of courses attended with any of the student￿ s peers
(see Section 4.1 for a detailed description of the instruments).22
Moreover, given the randomness and the relatively large size of the peer groups, we have very
little variation in E(xjGi), especially when we adopt the largest de￿nition of peers. In that case
(columns 5 and 6) we cannot identify ￿ and the constant separately in equation (1) and we omit
the average predetermined characteristics of the peer group.23
With our preferred restricted de￿nition, instead, despite the random allocation the groups are
su¢ ciently small to guarantee enough sample variation to achieve identi￿cation of all the e⁄ects.
Even in this case the estimated ￿￿ s are never signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero but the endogenous
e⁄ect is hardly a⁄ected by the introduction of E(xjGi) in the speci￿cation.
Thus, in Table 7 we report in columns 1 and 2 estimates based on the restricted de￿nition of
peers and including the full set of exogenous e⁄ects, in columns 3 and 4 we maintain the restricted
de￿nition of the groups but we exclude the exogenous e⁄ects from the speci￿cation, so that results
can be easily compared with those reported in columns 5 and 6, where we de￿ne peers using the
looser de￿nition (and the full set of exogenous e⁄ects cannot be included).
To facilitate the interpretation of our results, which is somewhat complicated by the weighting
scheme, Table 7 reports the marginal e⁄ects computed for the average student and the average peer.
So, for example, the reported estimates for the weighted fraction of peers choosing CLEP measure
the e⁄ect for an average student of having one additional average peer choosing economics. And,
according to the descriptive statistics presented in Table 5, two average restricted peers take 4.16
courses together while two average loose peers take only 1.57 courses together.24
22Weighting excluded peers by the number of links with the main student simply improves the e¢ ciency of the
estimates. Results are robust to weighting all excluded peers equally.
23The results in columns 5 and 6 are, however, robust to controlling for a subset of x￿ s at the group level, and the
estimated ￿ in that speci￿c case is never signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
24These marginal e⁄ects are essentially computed by multiplying the actual coe¢ cients by the weight of an averageWhile the OLS estimates are never signi￿cant in any of the speci￿cations, the IV estimates are
considerably larger and clearly indicate the presence of signi￿cant endogenous peer e⁄ects in the
choice of major.25 Our preferred speci￿cation is the one in column 2 where we use the restricted
de￿nition of peers, IV estimator and condition on the full set of group characteristics. In this
speci￿cation, the estimates indicate that having one additional average peer opting for economics
increases the probability of choosing CLEP by approximately 7.4 percentage points.
This is a very large e⁄ect given that on average only about 13% of students major in economics.
Notice, however, that the average (weighted) size of a group of restricted peers is about 10 and
among these only roughly 1 peer chooses CLEP. Therefore, one additional (average) peer opting
for the economics major doubles the number of students choosing economics in one￿ s group. Put it
another way, a 10% increase in the share of restricted peers choosing CLEP raises the probability
of an average student to choose CLEP by roughly 13%. An elasticity larger than 1 that con￿rms
the importance of the multiplier e⁄ect.
Eliminating the exogenous e⁄ects from the set of control variables hardly a⁄ects the results,
with an estimated e⁄ect of about 7 percentage points. This compares to a much smaller e⁄ect of
about 0.8 percentage points that we obtain in column 6 adopting the looser de￿nition of peers. This
di⁄erence is consistent with the fact that, given the larger groups, E(yjGi) now varies a lot less.
In fact, the standard deviation of the (weighted) share of peers choosing economics is now equal to
0.09, as compared to only 0.01 if the groups include all peers encountered in the 7 common courses
that we consider.
Contrary to what is a common result, our IV estimates are larger than the OLS. In fact, it is
generally thought that the OLS results over-estimate the actual size of the peer-e⁄ect because they
cumulate the impact of endogenous e⁄ects and correlated e⁄ects or group shocks. However, this
interpretation rests on the implicit assumption that the two e⁄ects in￿ uence the dependent variable
in the same direction. Group shocks are assumed to a⁄ect all students in the same direction,
thus leading to lower dispersion in individual outcomes within groups. In our case, the positive
di⁄erence between the IV and the OLS estimates suggests, instead, that the correlated group
peer. According to the restricted de￿nition, the average student has approximately 10.77 peers with whom she takes
4.16 courses together out of 7. Thus, the weight of the average peer is 4.16/(7x10.77)=0.0552. Using the loose
de￿nition, the average student has approximately 151 average peers with whom she sits together in 1.57 courses on
average. Hence, the weight of the average peer is 1.57/(7x151)=0.0015.
25The IV coe¢ cients are 5 to 6 times larger than the OLS ones.shock leads students in the same group to make more di⁄erentiated choices that they would have
otherwise made. A possible example with teacher quality would be the following: encountering the
most informative of economics professors o⁄ers all students a clear picture of what the subject is
really about, thus allowing them to make their own choice according to their actual preferences and
without relying much on their peers.
To support this interpretation, we repeated the analysis focusing exclusively on the subset
of students with the most homogeneous groups of peers along one speci￿c dimension, the initial
preference for economics. We selected only those students with either very many (top 90th percentile)
or very few (bottom 10th percentile) peers who were "determined" to do economics since their ￿rst
enrolment at Bocconi. In these homogenous groups we expect the correlated shock to a⁄ect (almost)
everyone in the same direction, thus leading to similar individual behaviors. Consistent with this
interpretation, in this selected sub-sample the IV estimates are smaller than the OLS (we omit
the results for brevity). Notice additionally that the limited variation in the endogenous variable
E(yjGi) exacerbates the downward bias of the OLS estimate.26
Our OLS estimates are in line with the results in Sacerdote (2001), where no signi￿cant e⁄ect is
found on major choice. However, once we account for possible group shocks (not taken into account
in Sacerdote￿ s setting), the e⁄ect becomes sizeable and signi￿cant.
Overall, the estimates in Table 7 indicate the presence of strong and large endogenous peer e⁄ects
and are obtained using instrumental variables that appear to be very signi￿cant in explaining the
endogenous term.27 The F-test of excluded instruments, reported at the bottom of Table 7, is
always very large. Table C.1 in Appendix A shows the complete ￿rst-stage regressions for all our
IV speci￿cations.
Theoretically we could have used a very large set of instruments (all the exogenous characteristics
of the excluded peers), however, in order to maximize e¢ ciency, we have selected a subset of the
most powerful ones, i.e. admission test, high school ￿nal grade and preferences for economics. All
these instruments are also singularly signi￿cant in the ￿rst-stage regressions at a very strong level,
26To clarify this point, consider a simple linear model with just one regressor: y = x￿ + ", where x is endogenous
and a valid instrument z is available. In this simple case, the OLS estimator can be written as: b ￿OLS = ￿ +
Cov(x;")
V ar(x) .
In the particular case of the linear probability model, it is easy to show that, for given V ar(E(xjy)), the bias is larger
the smaller the variance of the endogenous variable.
27Although the analysis focuses on a selective institution, we have no reasons to believe that endogenous peer
e⁄ects should be stronger in such a setting.with t-statistics between 4 and 8. The only exception is the average admission test of the excluded
peers that is insigni￿cant when conditioning on exogenous e⁄ects.28
We also investigate whether the endogenous e⁄ect is heterogenous in some observable dimensions,
namely in the share of economics-determined students, family income, gender composition and so
on. This exercise may suggest some simple policy intervention if, as we will investigate later,
the endogenous peer e⁄ects can potentially contribute to skill mismatch. There is an important
dimension of heterogeneity that we can clearly identify and that is consistent with our prior: the
share of determined economics students in one￿ s group.
The endogenous e⁄ect is only signi￿cant and economically meaningful in peer groups where the
relative majority of peers are not determined ex-ante to take economics and the student herself is
not determined. For a student who is ex-ante determined to take economics, the endogenous e⁄ect
is positive and signi￿cant only if a quite large share (top quartile in the sample distribution) of her
peers are determined to take economics.
In the light of these results, if the university wanted to counteract a possible endogenous e⁄ect
in the choice of major, it could implement a conditional random allocation making sure to have
enough determined to take economics in a given group but not too many. However, we believe the
above policy and the ￿optimal￿design of groups to be beyond the scope of this work and we will
leave it to further research. The point made here aims at opening up some room for potentially
important policy suggestions on group formation arising from the apparent heterogeneity of the
estimated e⁄ects along observable dimensions.
5 Robustness
Throughout the paper we relied on a number of more or less stringent assumptions. In this section
we present a series of robustness checks to give a sense of whether a particular stand is central to
the results presented so far.
First of all, we experiment further with how the groups of peers are constructed. The de￿nition
that we adopt throughout the paper is based on the assumption that students interact in the
classroom and that the more courses they attend together, the more hours they will spend in the
28The J-tests for overidenti￿cation always con￿rm the validity of all the instruments.same classrooms, the more intensively they will interact. The weighting scheme that assigns higher
weight to students who attend more courses together is meant to capture such an intensity of the
interactions.
[TABLE 8]
Our main results are based on either a very simple linear weighting scheme or on a more extreme
one that assigns weight zero to any peer that has been encountered in less than 4 courses and
increases linearly as the number of common courses increases. In Table 8 we present results obtained
employing two alternative weighting functions.
First (in the second row of the table), we exclude the courses in quantitative subjects (math
and statistics) from our de￿nition of peer groups, thus considering only classmates that attended
courses in economics and business (5 courses in total) in the same classes.29 Additionally, in the
third row of Table 8, we go back to considering all 7 courses but we adopt an exponential weighting
scheme, which assigns to each peer j of student i a weight equal to the exponential of the number of
courses that i and j have attended in the same classes, minus 1. Like in Table 7, we always report
the marginal e⁄ects of having one additional average peer choosing economics.
The estimated endogenous peer e⁄ects are highly comparable with our baseline speci￿cations
in Table 7, whose estimates are reported in the ￿rst row of Table 8. Hence, the weighting function
does not seem to be crucial for identi￿cation in our setting.
We also performed the following thought experiment: assume that the peer groups we have
de￿ned have nothing to do with interactions and the e⁄ects that we estimate are generated by
mere sample variation (or measurement error or anything else). We then construct placebo peer
groups by arti￿cially and randomly assigning students to hypothetical classes. We expect to ￿nd
no signi￿cant e⁄ect when the groups are formed using this arti￿cial allocation. In fact, in none of
the many speci￿cations reported in the fourth row of Table 8 is there an indication of signi￿cant
social interactions, and the magnitude of the point estimates is much closer to zero then in Table 7.
Our strategy for dealing with group-speci￿c shocks relies on the IV approach discussed in Section
4. As an alternative, we can also construct observable proxies for what is plausibly the most
important group shock: teacher quality. From the student evaluation questionnaires we can de￿ne
29We chose the courses most closely related to the choice of major.for each of the 7 courses the best and the worst lecturers as those who received the highest and
the lowest average mark on the item named quality of teaching.30 The results reported in Table 8
(row 5) are obtained from models similar to those in Table 7, where we have augmented the set of
control variables with a dummy for each of the courses considered, which takes value 1 if the student
attended the course in the class of the lecturer who obtained the best students￿evaluation. The
estimates are again in line with those of Table 7, suggesting that either the teacher dummies are
not fully capturing the e⁄ect of teaching quality or that other group shocks may also be important
(e.g. disruptive behavior).
Finally, information from the students￿questionnaires (see Table 4) suggests that in some cases
the actual allocation of students into the classes might not have been maintained. Several anecdotes
reveal that, especially for the most di¢ cult courses, students tended to cluster in the class of the best
teacher regardless of their o¢ cially assigned class. Our data provide some evidence in this direction.
For example, from Table 4 we know that in mathematics class 12 the number of questionnaires
collected on the day of the course evaluation (253) was almost 60% higher than the number of
o¢ cially enrolled students (161).31
To account for the possibility that students assigned to the same teaching class may actually
attend a course in di⁄erent classes, we adjust our weights by proportionally lowering the importance
of peers encountered in courses where there are signals that the o¢ cial allocation was not e⁄ectively
maintained. We identify these particular courses by exploiting the following question from the
students￿questionnaire: "For your learning, the number of students attending your class has been:
insu¢ cient (1), too low (2), ideal (3), too high (4), excessive (5)￿ . Tables 4 reports the average score
of this question - which we label congestion - across courses and for each single class, respectively.
Courses in which the random allocation is not maintained should be characterized by a large
variation across classes in this measure of congestion, i.e. there should be some classes with very
many students and others with very few ones. We, then, construct course weights by assigning
weight 1 to the course with the lowest maximum level of reported congestion across classes (i.e.
2:51 for Management II), and the weights of the other courses are scaled down accordingly (these
weights are shown in the last column of Table 4). The peers of a generic student i are then assigned
30Students are asked to give a synthetic evaluation on a scale 0 to 10.
31Note that, for anonymization purposes, the class identi￿er is a randomized version of the true class number.a weight equal to the sum of the course weights corresponding to the courses taken in the same
classes as i (normalized to sum to 1 within groups).
The last row of Table 8 reports the estimated endogenous peer e⁄ects under this particular
weighting scheme and shows that the results are very similar to our baseline, suggesting that, in
fact, problems of congestion were limited to a few cases.
To conclude this section, we brie￿ y discuss the implications of measurement error in the def-
inition of the peer groups for our estimates. Ammermueller and Pischke (2006) provide a rather
comprehensive analysis of identi￿cation of peer e⁄ects in the presence of measurement error gener-
ated by either misresponses or missing values. Given that our data are drawn from the university
administrative archives, the ￿rst type of error is probably negligible in our setting. Unfortunately,
however, the second type of error is substantially more complex in our data than in Ammermueller
and Pischke (2006). On the one hand, our groups might not include all relevant peers either because
of the few missing observations or because there might be in￿ uential friends outside one￿ s randomly
assigned classmates. On the other hand, the relatively large size of our classes suggests that some
of the randomly assigned peers might hardly ever talk to each other.
Moreover, given the complex network structure employed for identi￿cation, it is a priori unclear
in which direction should measurement error bias our estimates. Even if random, as in Ammermuller
and Pischke (2006), this double-faced type of error most likely biases OLS downwards but has very
unclear implications for our proposed IV estimator. This is due to the fact that the measurement
errors in the de￿nition of peers and of excluded peers are necessarily correlated, thus invalidating
our instruments. Without further assumptions, it is impossible to determine the direction of the
bias in the IV estimator.
In order to study the implications of measurement error in our setting, we construct a simple
Montecarlo experiment. We generate data from a structural process where the probability of being
friends to each other increases with the number of classes taken together but is never equal to one.
At the same time, we allow students to be friends with some positive probability even if they have
never taken any course together.32 We, then, look at the performance of our IV estimator vis a vis
the simple OLS approach under di⁄erent assumptions on the probability of being friends without
32In our simulation, the probability of being friends does not depend on any observable or unobservable character-
istics of the individual. In this sense, we analyze the e⁄ect of measurement error in a setting where group formation
is exogenous.taking classes together and the probability of not being friends, even when taking classes together.
Additionally, we also look at how our estimator performs when the intensity of the correlated e⁄ects
varies.
The results of this simulation exercise show that in all scenarios the IV performs surprisingly
well, and certainly better than the OLS, in recovering the true endogenous e⁄ect. Indeed, our
simulations show that we might be underestimating the true parameter by a very small factor. All
the details of the simulation and the results are reported in Appendix B.
6 Are books better than company?
In this section we analyze the relationship between students￿academic performance in the second
half of their degree (i.e. the non-common semesters) and how they chose their major, i.e. based
more on their own revealed ability or on their peers￿behavior.33
To this end, we construct two indicators. The ￿rst one, fi, measures the relative fraction of peers
who made one￿ s same choice of major. Suppose individual i chooses to specialize in economics, then
fi is computed as the ratio between the (weighted) fraction of i￿ s peers who also chose economics
and the fraction of all students in the sample who chose economics. If fi > 1 it means that in i￿ s
peer group there is a higher than average incidence of students in economics. Similarly for students










BUSINESSj if BUSINESSi = 1
(5)
where ECONi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if student i chooses economics and zero otherwise
(similarly for BUSINESSi).
The second indicator, gi, is a measure of relative ability. Our data include very detailed infor-
mation on each exam, including the grade. We consider the nine common exams taken during the
￿rst three semesters and group them into areas - economics, business, quantitative and other - as
described in Section 2. Suppose individual i chooses to specialize in economics, then gi is computed
33For the analysis in this and the next section we adopt the restricted de￿nition of peers. All the results are,
however, robust to changes in the de￿nition.as the ratio between i￿ s average grade in the exams of the economics area and i￿ s average grade
in the exams of the business area. Similarly for students who chose business. We normalize this
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(6)
where GPAECON
i is i￿ s average grade in economics￿exams and GPABUSINESS
i is i￿ s average grade in
business￿exams. If gi > 1 it means that, during the ￿rst three semesters and compared to all other
students, i performed better in the exams of the major she eventually chose as a specialization. Note
that in constructing this indicator we only consider the common exams of the ￿rst three semesters,
namely economics I and II for economics, and management I, management II and accounting for
business.
According to these indicators, we de￿ne four groups of students. The ￿rst group, which we
label ability driven, includes those students who chose the major subject in which they performed
(relatively) better during the ￿rst three semesters, against the (relative) majority of their peers, i.e.
gi > 1 and fi < 1. The second group - the peer driven - are students who chose the same major
as the (relative) majority of their peers and against their (relative) revealed ability, i.e. fi > 1 and
gi < 1. The third group - the coherent - includes those students who made a choice of major that
is coherent with their performance as well as with their peers, i.e. fi > 1 and gi > 1. Finally, some
students - the incoherent - chose against both their academic record and their peers, i.e. fi < 1 and
gi < 1. Table 9 summarizes these de￿nitions.
[TABLE 9]
As the table shows, students are rather evenly distributed across the four groups. The largest
(29.11%) is represented by the coherent, i.e. students who choose both according to their ability
and their peers. Peer driven students, i.e. those who follow peers in contrast with the indication of
their academic performance, are only slightly less numerous (27.56%). Ability driven students, i.e.
those who choose against the relative majority of their peers and follow the signal of their revealedperformance, represent 23.13% of the sample, leaving a sizeable 20.16% of students in the group of
the incoherent, i.e. those who choose against both peers and revealed ability.
We use these groups to estimate the e⁄ect of these decision modes on three academic outcomes:
average grade in the last two and a half years of the degree (i.e. after the major choice is made),
graduation mark and time to graduation. A general speci￿cation of the equations that we estimate
in this section is the following:
yi = c + ￿1[peer driven]i + ￿2[coherent]i + ￿3[incoherent]i + #xi + ui: (7)
where yi is the outcome considered and the other variables are dummies that identify the groups
(with the ability driven kept as a reference group). The set of controls - xi - includes a gender dummy,
household income (as recorded at ￿rst enrolment), a dummy for students who reside outside the
city of Milan, a set of dummies for the region of origin, a series of controls for academic performance
and ability (high school grades and type, average grades in the common exams, a dummy for the
specialization, and the number of common exams taken on the ￿rst available session).
[TABLE 10]
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 10. Columns 2 and 4 extend the speci￿cation
for average grades in the non-common courses and graduation mark with an additional covariate:
time to graduation. In column 5, when we look at time to graduation, we replace the average
grade in the common courses with the average grade in all courses. Notice that the maintained
assumption is that, conditional on the observables, the four categories are independent from the
outcome variable.34
Our main interest is the comparison between the ability driven and the peer driven. These are
in fact the only groups that face a trade-o⁄between their relative aptitude for one subject over the
other and the decisions of their mates. The coherent and the incoherent are somewhat uninteresting
in this respect, as, whatever choice they make, it is either in accordance or in contrast with both
their aptitudes and their peers￿choices.
34We assume a basic version of the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), where selection is on observables
and we can control for all those variables a⁄ecting both the decision mode and the outcomes considered.Although the e⁄ect is small in magnitude, there is clear evidence that peer driven students on
average perform worse than the ability driven in terms of both average and ￿nal grade, while there
seems to be no detectable di⁄erence in time to graduation. We estimate a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect
of -0.17 to -0.20 of a grade point on the average grade in non-common exams (exam grades are
given on a scale from 0 to 30 with a passing grade equals to 18) and of -0.64 to -0.74 on the ￿nal
grade (given on a scale from 0 to 110 with passing a grade equals to 66).
6.1 Labor market e⁄ects
In this section we correlate the major decision modes of section 6 with measures of skill mismatch
in the labor market. Depending on the mechanism that generates the endogenous social interaction
e⁄ects estimated in section 4.2, one might expect di⁄erent implications on the labor market. For
example, if peers￿interactions are mainly driven by the exchange of valuable information, the
decision to follow one￿ s peers should lead to better job matches. On the contrary, if peer-driven
students (as de￿ned in the previous section) simply enjoy spending time with their peers, this may
in fact come at the cost of a worse job match in the labor market.
Our data allow us to explore these issues thanks to the possibility of linking the administrative
information with the surveys of graduates. In particular, we concentrate on two outcomes. The
￿rst and most obvious is wages, which are observed for all graduates who have had a job between
their graduation day and the day of their interview.
[TABLE 11]
The ￿rst two columns of Table 11 report results from simple regressions of (log) wages on the
dummies for decision modes, as de￿ned in the previous section. In column 1 we condition on a
gender dummy, high school ￿nal grade, admission test results, household income at enrolment,
degree type, contract type, a dummy for students who attended foreign high schools, a dummy
equal to one if the actual degree obtained by the student corresponds to the one indicated as the
most preferred upon admission, year dummies and survey wave dummies. In the second column we
augment this set of controls with graduation mark and time to graduation (measured in quarters) to
verify whether the di⁄erent decision modes only a⁄ect labor market outcomes through their impacton academic results (as documented in Table 10). Since wages are recorded in intervals, the results
in Table 11 are produced with interval regressions.35
Results show that peer driven students earn approximately 13% less than their ability driven
counterparts. This e⁄ect indicates that the implications of choosing a major against one￿ s academic
aptitudes go beyond the mere ￿nal graduation mark. This, in fact, supports our conjecture on the
role of peers in driving towards ine¢ cient outcomes. For comparison purposes, in column 3 we
simply regress wages on academic results (graduation mark and duration of studies) to estimate
their overall e⁄ect on earnings. In this regression we still condition on the large set of controls
described above. Consistent with the small e⁄ect of decision modes on academic outcomes shown
in Table 10, the coe¢ cients on these variables do not change substantially and indicate a relatively
small e⁄ect of graduation marks on wages: a one point increase in graduation mark leads to a 1.8%
increase in the ￿rst wage.36 The robustness of the results to the inclusion of additional regressors
also corroborates the simple mean independence assumption that underlies these estimates and that
rests essentially on the richness of the control set.
[TABLE 12]
The second measure of mismatch is a dummy variable for job satisfaction constructed from the
alumni questionnaire.37 Table 12 reports results from a set of probit regressions for this indicator
of mismatch along the same lines of the wage analysis of Table 11. We ￿nd a strong and signi￿cant
e⁄ect of being peer-driven on the likelihood of being mismatched in the ￿rst job, and this result is
robust to the inclusion of academic outcomes as controls.38 The marginal e⁄ects reported in the
table measure the hypothetical experiment of an average ability driven student who changes status
35The same results have been produced with alternative econometric speci￿cations (i.e. linear OLS using the
mid-points of the intervals, quantile regression, ordered probit) and the magnitude and signi￿cance of the estimated
e⁄ects vary only slightly.
36Theoretically, graduation marks range from 66 to 110, but the minimum observed value is 82 with a standard
deviation of 7.5 over an average of 101.
37Namely, from the following question: "In your ￿rst job, have you experienced any of the following prob-
lems/di¢ culties?" The list of possible answers is: tasks were too easy, tasks were too demanding, problems with
team work, relationship problems with colleagues, di¢ culties with ￿nding one￿ s position in the organization, job is
not secure, low pay, job does not ￿t personal attitudes. More than one item can be indicated. The measure we adopt
is a simple dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent indicates at least one problem and zero otherwise.
38The results also change very little with the inclusion of wage categories.and becomes peer driven. Such change would lead to an increase of 13 percentage points in the
probability of reporting any di¢ culty in the ￿rst job (over an average of about 76%).
Interestingly, the graduation mark does not appear to correlate with mismatch, whereas time to
graduation does. In our sample those who take longer to complete their degree (conditional on the
￿nal mark) end up in substantially better matches, most likely because they spend time searching
during their last months in college. This result is con￿rmed in column 3, where we eliminate the
decision mode dummies from the set of regressors. As in Table 11, the similarity of the estimates in
the three columns supports the identi￿cation assumptions of these estimates and at the same time
suggests that decision modes and academic results a⁄ect labor market outcomes through distinct
channels.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we present a novel strategy for the identi￿cation of social interactions and we investi-
gate whether peers￿behavior a⁄ects the choice of college major, and the academic and labor market
performances of young individuals. The available data and the structure of the degree allow us to
identify the endogenous e⁄ect of peers on this decision, circumventing the two crucial identi￿cation
problems of studies of social interactions: endogeneity and re￿ ection.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we solve the long-standing identi￿cation
problems in the estimation of social interactions. Second, we estimate the importance of peers￿
actions on one￿ s choice of major. Further, we evaluate the labor market e⁄ects of choosing a major
based more on peers￿behavior than on one￿ s revealed ability, and we ￿nd a negative impact on both
wages and perceived mismatch of skills.
There can be many possible mechanisms generating endogenous peer e⁄ects. On the one hand, if
students follow the choices of their peers simply because there is a utility gain in studying together,
one may interpret the wage e⁄ect estimated in the last section as the monetary value of such utility
advantage. Alternatively, if it is peer pressure or imitation that generates peer e⁄ects (Mas and
Moretti, 2008), then this wage loss can e⁄ectively be interpreted as the cost of decisions that are not
based exclusively on e¢ ciency considerations. Finally, in the introduction we also suggested that
peers may represent a source of useful information about some hard-to-see features of university lifeand/or major choice (where to ￿nd the right material to study, which are the best or the easiest
courses, the best teachers, etc.). Our estimates of the labor market e⁄ects suggest that this is
unlikely to be the mechanism that generates peer e⁄ects in our study. Better informed individuals
should in principle make better choices, but the labor market penalties associated with the peer
driven students is in contrast with this interpretation. It should also be noted that any combination
of these explanations may actually be at the origin of the e⁄ects that we estimate.
If social interaction e⁄ects are important, as we show, they might actually lead to low level
social equilibria and contribute to the sluggish supply of skills in the labor market (Goldin and
Katz, 2007). From a policy perspective, our results highlight the relevance of social interactions
that should, therefore, be taken into account in the design of policies. Moreover, our identi￿cation
strategy emphasizes the importance of including information on one￿ s social network when collecting
data.
Having convincingly shown the existence of pure endogenous peer e⁄ects, as in this paper,
understanding the exact mechanism that underlies social interactions is perhaps the next big open
question in this branch of the literature.
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37Table 1: Common exams CLEA/CLEP 
 Semester  Area 
    
Management I   1
st Business 
Mathematics   1
st Quantitative 
Private Law   1
st Law 
Accounting   2
nd Business 
Economics I   2
nd Economics 
Public Law   2
nd Law 
Economics II   3
rd Economics 





Table 2: Descriptive statistics: 
Variable Mean  (s.d.)  min  max  Obs. 
Individual characteristics          
1=CLEP 0.127  -  0  1  1141 
1=female 0.396  -  0  1  1141 
(log) household income
1 7.91  (4.44)  0  11.7  1141 
highest income braket
1 0.227  (0.419)  0  1  1141 
1=non-resident
2 0.633  -  0  1  1141 
1=determined economics
3 0.15  -  0  1  1141 
          
Academic measures          
Graduation mark
4 102  (7.7)  76  111  1027 
time to graduation (in years)
5 5.34  (0.661)  4  7  1027 
av. grade in all exams  26.2  (2.05)  20  30  1141 
av. grade in common exams  24.8  (2.29)  19  30.3  1141 
av. grade in quantitative common exams  23.7  (3.09)  18  31  1141 
av. grade in economics common exams  24.7  (2.94)  18  31  1141 
av. grade in business common exams  25.6  (2.49)  18  31  1141 
admission test
6 69.1  (7.42)  43  91  1141 
high school final grade
7 86.3  (11.2)  60  100  1141 
          
Labour market outcomes          
wage in the first job
8 942.7  (499.2)  750  5,000  432 
1=mismatched
9 0.748  -  0  1  448 
Notes:          
1.  If a student declares that household income falls in the highest income bracket no further information is 
collected therefore household income is coded to 1 for households in the last bracket and an ad-hoc dummy 
controls for this group. 
2.  Resident outside the province of Milan.           
3.  DES as first or second preferred course in admission test courses’ ranking  
4. Range 0-111 (pass = 60).           
5. Official duration is 4 years.           
6. Normalized between 0 and 100.           
7. Normalized between 0 and 100 (pass = 60).           
8. Wages are reported in intervals. The reported statistics refer to an estimated wages computed at the mid point 
of the interval indicated by the responded. All monetary values are evaluated in 2005 Euros. 
9. Mismatched=1 if the respondent reports having had difficulties with her first job (tasks were too demanding, 










Table 3: Characteristics of CLEA/CLEP students. 
        

















             
Total  1141 25.63  24.69  23.67  24.83 86.3  69.06 
             
CLEP  145 26.82  26.79  25.81  26.52 92.2  72.48 
             
CLEA  996 25.48  24.39  23.35  24.59 85.4  68.57 




  1.36*** 2.40***  2.46***  1.94***  6.79***  3.91*** 
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Table 4: Characteristics of courses and lecturing classes 
      Subject Semester  Number of 
classes  Characteristics 
Average (s.d.) Min Max 
Enrolled students  140.40 (14.92)  130  169 
Student questionnaires  80.70 (13.70)  62  109 
Average attendance
1 (%)  85.67 (1.12)  84.08  87.24 
Management I  I  10 
Congestion
2 (1 to 5)  3.33 (0.15)  3.16  3.61 
Enrolled students  140.80 (16.91)  125  164 
Student questionnaires  102.80 (63.86)  28  253 
Average attendance
1 (%)  83.89 (1.53)  81.39  86.51 
Mathematics I  10 
Congestion
2 (1 to 5)  3.77 (0.52)  3.00  4.57 
Enrolled students  351.75 (164.14)  189  510 
Student questionnaires  70.00 (27.02)  38  104 
Average attendance
1 (%)  79.73 (4.52)  74.91  83.89 
Private Law  I  4 
Congestion
2 (1 to 5)  3.07 (0.13)  2.95  3.23 
Enrolled students  142.80 (47.75)  109  258 
Student questionnaires  100.30 (61.17)  54  215 
Average attendance
1 (%)  84.80 (1.25)  82.26  86.58 
Accounting II 10 
Congestion
2 (1 to 5)  3.46 (0.48)  3.02  4.40 
Enrolled students  216.50 (92.67)  85  316 
Student questionnaires  136.83 (103.78)  24  317 
Average attendance
1 (%)  84.92 (1.23)  83.56  86.84 
Economics I  II  6 
Congestion
2 (1 to 5)  3.63 (0.72)  2.83  4.82 
Enrolled students  351.75 (147.84)  217  528 
Student questionnaires  41.00 (20.12)  15  64 
Average attendance
1 (%)  82.72 (2.54)  79.45  85.62 
Public Law  II  4 
Congestion
2 (1 to 5)  2.89 (0.16)  2.67  3.03 
Enrolled students  222.83 (99.20)  156  381 
Student questionnaires  109.17 (52.42)  19  176 
Average attendance
1 (%)  83.87 (1.97)  81.42  86.80 
Economics II  III  6 
Congestion
2 (1 to 5)  2.96 (0.47)  2.47  3.72 
Enrolled students  184.25 (104.07)  123  382 
Student questionnaires  80.75 (25.94)  56  125 
Average attendance
1 (%)  84.38 (0.63)  83.38  85.27 
Management II  III  8 
Congestion
2 (1 to 5)  2.14 (0.25)  1.76  2.51 
Enrolled students  272.25 (90.00)  142  404 
Student questionnaires  140.75 (58.91)  35  203 
Average attendance
1 (%)  85.66 (1.04)  83.31  86.53 
Statistics III  8 
Congestion
2 (1 to 5)  3.27 (0.93)  2.09  4.46 
1 .   S e l f   r e p o r t e d   b y   t h e   s t u d e n t s .           
2. Congestion is defined from students evaluations as the average answer given to the following question: “For your 
learning, the number of students attending your class has been: insufficient (1), too low (2), ideal (3), too high (4), 
e x c e s s i v e   ( 5 ) ” .           
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Table 5: Size of peer groups, various definitions. 
 












        
Mean  18.08 674.47  252.53  Raw group size  Std. dev.  (6.77) (79.10)  (60.96) 
        
Mean  4.16 1.57  0.00  Average number of 
courses taken 
together 
Std. dev.  (0.11) (0.06)  (0.00) 
        
Mean  10.77 151.07  --  Weighted group size  Std. dev.  (4.08) (19.73)  -- 
        
1.  Students who have been assigned to the same lecturing class in at least 4 of the 7 common 
courses considered. 
2.  Students who have been assigned to the same lecturing class at least once over the 7 common 
courses considered. 
3.  Students who have never been assigned to the same lecturing class in any of the 9 common 
courses but who have attended some of the 7 courses considered who at least one peer student. 
 
 
Table 6: Peers and later academic patters 
Definition of peers:  
number of courses attended in the same class 
  at least 1  at least 2  at least 3  at lest 4 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Panel A: Percentage of students who graduate in the same session 
      
Peers  13.438 13.890 16.346 22.418 
      
Non-peers  12.523 
      
Diff.  0.915*** 1.367*** 3.823*** 9.895*** 
      
Panel B: Percentage of students who choose the same sub-major 
      
Peers  9.645 9.685 9.908 9.633 
      
Non-peers  9.603 
      
Diff.  0.042 0.082*  0.306***  0.030 
      
Panel C: Percentage of students with the same thesis supervisor 
      
Peers  1.138 1.150 1.194 1.255 
      
Non-peers  0.957 
      
Diff.  0.181*** 0.193*** 0.237*** 0.298*** 
      





Table 7: Peer effects in the choice of major. Linear probability model 
Restricted peers  
(with exogenous effects) 
Restricted peers  
(no exogenous effects) 
All peers 
(no exogenous effects) 
OLS  2SLS
1 
weighted  OLS  2SLS
1 







[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
        
0.008 0.074* 0.001 0.069* 0.001 0.008* 
(0.006) (0.039) (0.006) (0.035) (0.001) (0.004) 
(weighted) 
Fraction peers 
choosing CLEP  [0.184] [0.054] [0.155] [0.053] [0.193] [0.068] 
        
Individual characteristics        
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***  0.005**  0.005***  Admission test
2  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.426*** 0.410*** 0.424*** 0.416*** 0.004*** 0.004***  High school final 
grade
3  (0.103) (0.106) (0.102) (0.106) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.099*** 0.110*** 0.098*** 0.112***  0.095**  0.089**  1=determined 
economics  (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) 
-0.012 -0.017 -0.012 -0.016 -0.011 -0.012  1=female  (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006  Log household 
income
4  (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
0.043 0.056 0.043 0.057 0.044 0.053  1=highest income 
bracket
4  (0.064) (0.067) (0.065) (0.069) (0.064) (0.064) 
-0.002 -0.014 -0.000 -0.012 0.001 -0.002  1=non resident
5  (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) 
High school type 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Nr. Obs.  1141 1141 1141 1141 1141 1141 
R
2  0.12 -- 0.12 -- 0.12 -- 
        
Shea Partial R
2  -- 0.288 -- 0.030 -- 0.071 
1
st stage F-test  -- 10.84 -- 12.17 -- 30.30 
        
The estimates refer to the effect of having one additional peer with average characteristics opting for economics (CLEP). 
1. Excluded instruments: averages of admission test, high school final grade, determined to do economics in the group of 
excluded peers who are not in one’s peer group. 
2. Normalised between 0 and 100. Average in the sample = 69.10 
3. Normalised between 0 and 100 (pass = 60). Average in the sample = 86.3 
4. If a student declares that household income falls in the highest income bracket no further information is collected therefore 
household income is coded to 1 for households in the last bracket and an ad-hoc dummy controls for this group. 
5. Resident outside the province of Milan. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: p-values in square brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8: Peer effects in the choice of major. Robustness checks 
  Restricted peers 
(with exogenous effects) 
Restricted peers 
(without exogenous effects)  All peers 
 OLS  2SLS 
weighted  OLS  2SLS 
weighted  OLS  2SLS 
weighted 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
        
0.008 0.074* 0.001 0.069* 0.001 0.008* 
(0.006) (0.039) (0.006) (0.035) (0.001) (0.004)  1. Baseline 
[0.184] [0.054] [0.155] [0.053] [0.193] [0.068] 
        
0.011 0.108* 0.012 0.091*  0.002**  0.006 
(0.008) (0.060) (0.007) (0.046) (0.001) (0.004) 
2. Groups based 
on 5 exams  [0.137] [0.071] [0.107] [0.051] [0.038] [0.101] 
        
0.006 0.074* 0.006 0.069*  0.001*  0.005** 
(0.005) (0.041) (0.005) (0.039) (0.000) (0.002) 
3. Exponential 
weights  [0.279] [0.069] [0.223] [0.079] [0.081] [0.048] 
        
-0.006 -0.022 -0.004 -0.016 0.001  0.000 
(0.005) (0.062) (0.003) (0.044) (0.001) (0.007) 
4. Placebo peer 
groups  [0.210] [0.720] [0.163] [0.718] [0.342] [0.975] 
        
0.004 0.068* 0.005 0.061* 0.001 0.008* 
(0.006) (0.041) (0.006) (0.036) (0.001) (0.005) 
5. Teacher quality 
controls  [0.494] [0.096] [0.357] [0.089] [0.531] [0.095] 
        
0.008 0.073* 0.008 0.068* 0.001 0.008* 
(0.006) (0.039) (0.006) (0.035) (0.001) (0.005) 
6. Course 
congestion 
  [0.171] [0.058] [0.145] [0.053] [0.531] [0.095] 
        
The estimates refer to the effect of having one additional peer with average characteristics opting for economics (CLEP). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: p-values in square brackets. 
 
 
Table 9: Distribution of decision modes (based on restricted peers) 












27.56%  PEERS’ INFLUENCE 









Table 10: Decision modes and academic outcomes 
Dependent variable:  Av. Grade in non-
common exams






 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
       
Decision  mode       
Peer driven  -0.205**  -0.168*  -0.737**  -0.641**  0.060 
  (0.091) (0.088) (0.308) (0.304) (0.053) 
Coherent -0.058  -0.050  -0.330  -0.310  0.006 
  (0.090) (0.088) (0.301) (0.297) (0.052) 
Incoherent -0.217**  -0.123  -0.776**  -0.534  0.182*** 
  (0.102) (0.099) (0.334) (0.333) (0.059) 
       
Ability measures       
Av. grade all exams  --  --  --  --  -0.168*** 
       (0.014) 
Av. grade common exams  0.643***  0.595***  2.875***  2.749***  -- 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.070) (0.072)   
Time to graduation  --  -0.479***  --  -1.245***  -- 
   (0.054)  (0.180)  
1=CLEP -0.268***  -0.217**  -0.235  -0.103  0.097* 
  (0.087) (0.087) (0.321) (0.324) (0.057) 
Admission test
4 0.006  0.005  -0.021  -0.023  0.001 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) 
High school final grade
5 2.534***  2.450***  7.497***  7.278***  0.359 
  (0.452) (0.428) (1.552) (1.508) (0.253) 
High school type dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
       
Individual characteristics       
1=female 0.340***  0.266***  1.042***  0.851***  -0.113*** 
  (0.065) (0.063) (0.220) (0.218) (0.039) 
Household income
6 -0.009  -0.015  -0.046  -0.061  -0.013 
  (0.031) (0.027) (0.108) (0.097) (0.016) 
1=highest income bracket
6 -0.018  -0.152  -0.345  -0.693  -0.282 
  (0.363) (0.319) (1.264) (1.133) (0.185) 
1=non resident
7 0.122  0.127  0.384  0.395  0.021 
  (0.096) (0.091) (0.319) (0.308) (0.057) 
Region of residence dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
       
Nr. Observations  1027  1027  1027  1027  1027 
R-squared 0.513  0.529  0.566  0.573  0.163 
1. Range 0-30 (18 = pass). Average in the sample = 26.97 
2. Range 0-111 (pass = 60). Average in the sample = 102.11 
3. Official duration is 4 years. Average in the sample = 5.34 
4. Normalised between 0 and 100. Average in the sample = 69.10 
5. Normalised between 0 and 100 (pass = 60). Average in the sample = 86.3 
6. If a student declares that household income falls in the highest income bracket no further information is collected therefore 
household income is coded to 1 for households in the last bracket and an ad-hoc dummy controls for this group. 
7. Resident outside the province of Milan. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Table 11: Wages and decision modes 
      
Dependent variable: log (monthly) wage in the first job
1 
        
  [1] [2] [3] 
Decision modes     
Peer driven  -0.130  -0.136*  - 
 (0.081)  (0.081)   
 [0.109]  [0.090]   
Coherent -0.153**  -0.141*  - 
 (0.076)  (0.074)   
 [0.045]  [0.058]   
Incoherent -0.082  -0.096  - 
 (0.087)  (0.086)   
 [0.343]  [0.265]   
      
Academic results     
graduation mark
2 -  0.018***  0.018*** 
   (0.006)  (0.006) 
   [0.002]  [0.002] 
time to graduation
4 -  0.094  0.089 
   (0.057)  (0.057) 
   [0.102]  [0.120] 
      
Observations 427 427 427 
1. Recorded in intervals. Estimation performed with interval regression. 
2. Range 0-111 (pass = 66) 
4. Measured in quarters (Official duration is 8 quarters) 
All regressions include the following set of controls: a gender dummy, high school final grade, admission test 
results, family income, degree type, contract type, a dummy for foreign students, a dummy equal to one if the 
actual degree attended by the student corresponds to the one indicated upon admission, year dummies and survey 
wave dummies. 
Robust standard errors in round parentheses and corresponding p-values in squared brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 12: Mismatch and decision modes 
 
Dependent variable: Probability of mismatch
1 
 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Decision modes     
Peer driven  0.443**  0.438**  - 
 (0.197)  (0.199)   
 [0.024]  [0.027]   
marginal effect
2 0.135  0.133   
Coherent 0.241  0.242  - 
 (0.180)  (0.180)   
 [0.179]  [0.178]   
marginal effect
2 0.074  0.073   
Incoherent 0.362*  0.376**  - 
 (0.190)  (0.191)   
 [0.056]  [0.049]   
marginal effect
2 0.106  0.108   
      
Academic results     
graduation mark
3 -  -0.002 -0.000 
   (0.013)  (0.013) 
   [0.896]  [0.979] 
marginal effect
2   -0.001  -0.000 
time to graduation
4 -  -0.410***  -0.407*** 
   (0.150)  (0.150) 
   [0.006]  [0.007] 
marginal effect
2   -0.135  -0.121 
      
Observations 436 436 436 
1. Dependent variable is 1 if the respondent reports having had difficulties with her first job (tasks were too 
demanding, not enough demanding, pay was too low, job did not fit one’s attitudes, et.). See text for details. Probit 
regression. 
2. The marginal effects are compute at the sample averages of all the covariates excluding the decision modes 
dummies that are all set to zero. 
3. Range 0-111 (pass = 66) 
4. Measured in quarters (Official duration is 8 quarters) 
All regressions include the following set of controls: a gender dummy, high school final grade, admission test 
results, family income, degree type, contract type, a dummy for foreign students, a dummy equal to one if the 
actual degree attended by the student corresponds to the one indicated upon admission, year dummies and survey 
wave dummies. 
Robust standard errors in round parentheses and corresponding p-values in squared brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
46Appendix A: Additional institutional details
The ￿rst set of data extracted from the university archives has been used in Garibaldi et al. (2007)
and kindly passed on to us. Our dataset is an extensively updated version of the same sample of
students with information on admission tests, teaching classes, course evaluations, labor market
outcomes, exchange programs, etc. The currently available dataset covers all students enrolled at
Bocconi since 1989.
Until the academic year 1999/2000, Bocconi o⁄ered four other degree programs in addition to
the CLEA/CLEP: one in "Economic and Social Sciences" (DES), one in "Economics of Financial
Market Institutions" (CLEFIN), one in "Management of the Public Administration and Interna-
tional Institutions" (CLAPI) and one in "Law and Business Administration" (CLELI).39 These
degree programs di⁄er both in their curricula and in the number of students admitted in each
academic year.40
In their application forms, prospective students had to rank the ￿ve programs according to their
preferences. Admission was based on a standardized entry test combined with high school perfor-
mance. Applicants were then ranked according to these results and, starting from the top of the
ranking, students were assigned to their preferred programs depending on availability. Speci￿cally,
a student was allocated to her ￿rst choice if there were still places available in that program; oth-
erwise, if all places in her ￿rst choice had already been taken by students higher up in the ranking,
the candidate was assigned to her second choice, and so on.
It is important to notice that in this mechanism, the student￿ s stated preferences across the
￿ve programs do not in￿ uence the probability of being admitted, thereby excluding any strategic
behavior in the reporting of preferences. This allows us to use this information to construct our
indicator of ex-ante preferences. In particular, we consider students who indicated the DES degree
- the more academically oriented version of CLEP - as a ￿rst or a second choice as "determined"
to do economics since the beginning of their studies.41
Admitted candidates who decided not to register freed places for students further down in the
39Created in 1970, CLEA (Degree in Business Administration) and CLEP (Degree in Economics) are the oldest
degrees o⁄ered at Bocconi University. Four years later, they were joined by DES, a more quantitative and academic
version of the CLEP. All the other degrees (CLEFIN, CLAPI and CLELI) were introduced in 1990.
40Enrolment ceilings and admission tests were introduced in 1984.
41These are students who either had CLEA/CLEP as a ￿rst choice and DES as a second or DES as ￿rst and
CLEA/CLEP as second, and who did not get a place in the DES.
47ranking. However, only a few students (48 out of 753 in our cohort) who had been initially rejected
took up a place freed by others, possibly because at the time of making these decisions most
people had already obtained admission to another university and started to make arrangements for
registration and accommodation.42
Eventually, the admission procedure in September 1998 led to 1,385 students (against a ceiling
of 1,600) enrolled in the common CLEA/CLEP track, followed by CLELI (239, against a ceiling of
350), CLEFIN (208, against a ceiling of 230), and CLAPI and DES (with, respectively, 132 and 91
against ceilings of 200 each). Once enrolled, CLEA/CLEP students were not allowed to switch to
any of the other degrees, while students enrolled in the CLELI, CLEFIN, CLAPI and DES programs
could move to CLEA/CLEP only after the ￿rst academic year.
In the academic year 1999/2000 Bocconi introduced a major reform of its structure (the so-called
"Bocconi 2000" plan). In particular, the CLEA/CLEP was abolished and students were forced to
choose a speci￿c degree upon entering the university with relatively limited chances to move across
programs at later stages. Moreover, the information on the random allocation of students to classes
has unfortunately been lost for the earlier cohorts of students and it is reliable only starting with
the academic year 1998/1999. This forces us to use only the cohort of students enrolled in the
CLEA/CLEP program in the academic year 1998/1999.
42Note also that candidates in the lower tail of the distribution of the admission test were not o⁄ered any of these
residual places.
48Appendix B: Monte-Carlo Simulations
To investigate the role of measurement error in the de￿nition of the peer groups we design a simple
Monte-Carlo experiment where we allow for the groups to be mis-measured in a random fashion.
To avoid confusion, in what follows we de￿ne the friends of a generic individual i as those students
who truly a⁄ect i￿ s outcome and peers those students who take classes together with i. Hence,
measurement error arises because not all friends are peers and not all peers are friends.
The speci￿c setting is the following: we simulate a simple world where an outcome yi is a function
of the (weighted) mean outcome and the (weighted) mean exogenous characteristics of one￿ s friends,
as well as individual traits (xi), the sequence of class-speci￿c unobserved confounder (U
g
i ) and an
iid error (￿i):
yi = ￿ + ￿E(y￿ijFi) + ￿E(x￿ijFi) + ￿xi + U
g
i + ￿i:
where Fi is the indicator of the group of friends of student i. For simplicity, in the simulation we con-
sider only a one-dimensional xi. Consistently with our empirical analysis in the main text, E(y￿ijFi)
and E(x￿ijFi) are computed weighting each friend by the number of courses taken together. Friends
who are not peers are assigned the weight of the average peer.
The correlated e⁄ect U
g
i is generated as to reproduce the sum of the macro-shocks (u
g
i) that









where the simplest example of an unobservable u
g
i shock would be teacher quality. This unobservable
U
g
i represent the correlated e⁄ect in the Manski (1993) wording and it is the source of endogeneity
of E(y￿ijFi) that our IV strategy is designed to address.
Next, we generate the vector of the xi￿ s, the class shocks ug and the idiosyncratic errors ￿i for a
sample of n students. Speci￿cally, we assume x ￿ N(￿ x;￿x), ug ￿ N(0;￿u) and ￿ ￿ N(0;￿￿). Given
the linear recursive structure of the model, we can solve for the full vector of the outcomes y, once
the groups of friends are de￿ned.
Consistently with our application, we ￿x the number of courses to 7 and the number of classes
49for each course to 10, allowing for an uneven distribution of students in each class within each
course.43 Then, we allocate students to classes, and consequentially to peers, according to a totally
random procedure and peers are de￿ned, just like in the main text, as those students who take
courses in the same classes.
Friends are de￿ned by a probabilistic process that depends on the number of courses two students
have taken together. Such process, and consequently the extent of measurement error, is regulated
by three crucial parameters:
Pr(Fij = 1jmeetij = 0) = ￿0
Pr(Fij = 1jmeetij = 1) = ￿1
Pr(Fij = 1jmeetij = 7) = ￿7:
where Fij = 1 if i and j are friends and meetij measures the number of courses i and j have taken
together. Hence, ￿0 is the probability of two students being friends, given that they never met in
the classroom, ￿1 is the corresponding probability for those students who met once, and ￿nally ￿7
gives the likelihood of friendship when the students met 7 times, i.e. the maximum in our simulated
(and actual) data.
We assume, as it seems natural, that ￿ increases (non-linearly) in the number of meetings: the
more often two students meet the more likely they will be friends and interact. This structure allows
a large degree of ￿ exibility in the extent of mis-measurement we can generate in the simulations,
while preserving a relatively simple structure. Each scenario will be de￿ned by the triplet (￿0;￿1;￿7)
and all the other values of ￿m = Pr(Fij = 1jmeetij = m) are computed under a simple linearity
assumption: ￿m = a+bm for m = 1;::;7.44 For example, a scenario of no measurement error is one
with ￿0 = 0, ￿1 = ￿7 = 1, so that all peers would also be friends and vice versa. Increasing ￿0 or
reducing one or both ￿1 and ￿7 leads to more mis-measurement.
Throughout the simulation we set the number of observations to 1150 (as in the actual data)
and the parameters ￿, ￿, ￿ and ￿￿ to the following reasonable values:
43Namely, we introduce some small random variation in class size within each course.








Given that our main interest in the simulation is on measurement error and its relation to
the endogenous macro-shock e⁄ect, we let ￿0, ￿1, and ￿u vary so as to construct a large set of
scenarios. For convenience, we ￿x ￿7 to a constant equal to 0.95. We then estimate the model from
the simulated data by OLS and IV, where the IV￿ s for student i, as in the paper, are the x￿ s of
the excluded peers. Given measurement error, these may not necessarily be also excluded friends.
For each of the simulated scenarios we replicate the data 100 times, estimating the model at each
replication. In Table B.1 we present results averaged over the 100 replications.
In the upper panel of Table B.1, we consider a scenario where the class shocks u
g
i have a relatively
large variance and, thus, the OLS estimates are more heavily a⁄ected by endogeneity bias. Overall,
the simulation shows that the IV strategy we introduce in the paper performs extremely well in all
the scenarios, irrespective of the degree of mis-measurement. While the OLS always overestimates
the true ￿ by over 10%, the IV is never biased by more than 4%. Similar results are reported in
the lower panel where we consider a scenario with ￿u = 0:1 (low endogeneity), although the OLS
and the IV estimators are now a lot more similar.
A ￿nal caveat should be borne in mind when comparing our empirical results with the simulation.
In fact, while in our analysis we consider a binary outcome and employ a linear probability model,
the simulated results are generated by a simple linear-in-means model. In principle, it is possible to
simulate a model that more closely mimics the one we use to produce our main results. However,
solving such model recursively would be a lot more complicated (mainly because it may feature
multiple equilibria) and the role of measurement error might be confounded by the speci￿c functional
form assumptions. Thus, we prefer to present simulation results based on a simpler model in order
to focus attention on the role of mis-measurement per se.
51Table B.1. Simulation results
Panel 1: High endogeneity ( σu=0.2)
π0 π1
% of peers who 
are friends
% of friends who 
are not peers






1.00 0.00 0.00 1.132 1.010
(0.010) (0.010)
0 0.3 0.34 0.00 0.66 1.106 0.983
(0.014) (0.014)
0 0.5 0.53 0.00 0.47 1.131 1.004
(0.012) (0.013)
0 0.7 0.72 0.00 0.28 1.120 0.996
(0.014) (0.015)
0.05 0.7 0.73 0.08 0.27 1.131 1.016
(0.014) (0.014)
0.05 0.7 0.74 0.16 0.26 1.134 1.014
(0.012) (0.012)
0.05 0.7 0.73 0.08 0.27 1.131 1.016
(0.013) (0.013)
0.1 0.3 0.41 0.16 0.59 1.146 1.039
(0.011) (0.011)
0.1 0.5 0.58 0.16 0.42 1.114 1.003
(0.011) (0.012)
0.1 0.7 0.74 0.16 0.26 1.134 1.014
(0.011) (0.013)
Panel 2: Low endogeneity ( σu=0.1)
1.00 0.00 0.00 1.033 1.001
(0.006) (0.006)
0 0.3 0.34 0.00 0.66 1.013 0.992
(0.007) (0.008)
0 0.5 0.53 0.00 0.47 1.008 0.982
(0.007) (0.007)
0 0.7 0.72 0.00 0.28 1.022 0.994
(0.007) (0.008)
0.05 0.7 0.73 0.08 0.27 1.032 1.004
(0.006) (0.007)
0.05 0.7 0.74 0.16 0.26 1.049 1.021
(0.006) (0.007)
0.05 0.7 0.73 0.08 0.27 1.032 1.004
(0.006) (0.006)
0.1 0.3 0.41 0.16 0.59 1.065 1.043
(0.007) (0.007)
0.1 0.5 0.58 0.16 0.42 1.055 1.031
(0.006) (0.006)
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Table C.1: IV First-stage regressions 
Restricted peers 
(with exogenous effects) 
Restricted peers 
(without exogenous effects)  All peers  Dependent variable: 
fraction of peers choosing 
CLEP  [1] [2]  [3] 
      
Instruments: excluded  peers’       
-0.423 0.023***  -0.357***  Admission test
2 
(0.472) (0.006)  (0.074) 
0.021*** -0.697  0.000***  High school final grade
3 
(0.006) (0.487)  (0.000) 
-0.418*** -0.463***  -0.140***  Fraction of determined 
economics  (0.104) (0.106)  (0.018) 
   
  
Individual characteristics      
-0.000 -0.000  -0.000*  Admission test
2 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.017 0.009  0.000  High school final grade
3 
(0.027) (0.028)  (0.000) 
-0.009 -0.013*  0.000  1=determined economics 
(0.007) (0.007)  (0.001) 
0.005 0.003  0.000  1=female 
(0.006) (0.005)  (0.000) 
-0.001 -0.000  -0.000  Log household income
4 
(0.002) (0.002)  (0.000) 
-0.012 -0.015  -0.003  1=highest income bracket
4 
(0.019) (0.022)  (0.004) 
0.007 0.008  0.000  1=non resident
5 
(0.007) (0.008)  (0.001) 
High school type dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region of residence dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
   
  
Nr. Obs.  1141 1141  1141 
1. Excluded instruments: averages of admission test, high school final grade, determined to do economics in the group 
of excluded peers who are not in one’s peer group. 
2. Normalised between 0 and 100. Average in the sample = 69.10 
3. Normalised between 0 and 100 (pass = 60). Average in the sample = 86.3 
4. If a student declares that household income falls in the highest income bracket no further information is collected 
therefore household income is coded to 1 for households in the last bracket and an ad-hoc dummy controls for this 
group. 
5. Resident outside the province of Milan. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: p-values in square brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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